Abstract
Introduction
With the development of IoT (Internet of things), Radio Frequency Identification has been widely used as one of the main technologies in the perception layer. More and more practical applications, such as the supply chain management and the medical care [1] [2] [3] , urge the RFID technology to improve efficiency and intelligence.
As a branch of the RFID security technologies, RFID grouping proof protocol [4] also causes concern gradually. The grouping proof protocols are implemented between the tags and the readers by authenticating to achieve some requirements, such as security, privacy and matching. The RFID grouping proof protocol was firstly introduced by Jules [5] . There were two schemes in his work. Although these schemes are not so secure that they could not resist some attacks and could not achieve the security goals, the research result of Jules guided a new direction for the RFID security technology. Afterwards, Saito et al. [6] improved the former scheme of Jules' work with the timestamp and produced their protocol named "grouping proof". Their approach can solve some problems and make up some of the vulnerabilities. Besides, Piramuthu [7] raised a new improved grouping proof model by introducing random timestamp. But it was suffered from attack on the communication between the tags and reader and attack by disassembling the tags. Then, it comes to a conclusion that reliability [8] , forward security [9] , anonymity [10] [11] [12] and anti-tracking [13] are the main security requirements by analyzing the existing RFID security protocols. With the development of RFID grouping proof protocols, there have been more and more guidelines put forward gradually [14] [15] . There are two important targets for RFID grouping proof protocols. They are the dependency between the tags and the scalability of the RFID system. The dependency between the tags can be used for the verification of matching. The scalability of the system is an important criterion to measure the performance of the system.
Design of the High Security RFID Grouping Proof Protocol

Basis
Assume that the total number of the tags in each group is m, and kk are selected by the trusted third party, which is different for the tags and reader in different group. The other keys are calculated and distributed using the key distribution method described later by the trusted third party.
Protocol Design
The Initialization
The keys of all the tags and readers are distributed by the trusted third party. Assume that the channel between the reader and the server is secure, so they can be seen as a whole in the RFID system and they are called reader for short. After the authentication, the tags and the reader update part of the keys , ii bc and the others are not updated. When there are new tags joining in the group or old tags leaving the group, the initialization phase will be performed again. The main work in the initialization phase is the key distribution. The details are described as below.
It is operated by the trusted third party to distribute the keys to the tags and the readers. 
The detailed scheme is described as follows:
Integrated all the constraint conditions, the points in line segment BC can be assigned to the i T a g as valid keys. The trusted third party selects a point from the line segment mentioned above as an initial key for the reader and tags. Because the value of the point may not be an integer, the value should be transformed into an integer by the encoding method as below. The method is described as follows.
Assume that there is a non-integer: K * * . * * 
I : T h e i n t e g e r p a r t D : T h e d e c i m a l p a r t
The integer part of the number "I" and the decimal part "D" should be transformed into a 64 -bit binary number "I" and "D". And then the result of '' || ID is computed as the value of K. 
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Copyright ⓒ 2015 SERSC It can be launched by the above allocation that each tag has only one corresponding straight line after this phase. The straight lines for the tags which belong to the same group have a same slope (these lines disjoint.). In addition, the group of keys for one tag is just one point of its corresponding straight line 2. The Authentication Process The protocol is based on the challenge-response pattern. There are three times interaction between tag and reader.
Firstly, the reader transmits the S and a random number R r to the tag. After receiving the message from the reader, the tag response with ( i T a g → R e a d e r ：After receiving the message from the reader, the tag will make a decision that whether the subsequent operation can be continued using S. If the value of S/m is equal with After receiving the response from the tag, it will check the information stored in the reader to make sure that whether the tag is legal or not. If the tag is a legal one, the grouping proof protocol will be continued. After receiving the message from the reader, the tag will authenticate the reader. If the reader is a legal one, the tag will update the keys For the tags, only after the reader is proved to be a legal one by the tag, can the keys be updated by the tags. The specific updating method is described as follows:
International 
Analysis on the Performance of the Protocol
For every RFID authentication protocol, computational overhead and safety requirements is a pair of contradiction. They are also two important standards to evaluate the protocols. A compromise is usually adopted between the computational overhead and the safety requirements. In this protocol, the overhead on computation has been improved. And most safety requirements can be met. There is detailed analysis shown as follows.
Analysis on Performance
In this protocol, the reader operates the authentication with every tag respectively. So there is no direct dependency between the messages coming from every tag. In addition, whether the reader can finish the authentication for the group successfully depends on the authentication between the reader and every tag. If every tag is authenticated by the reader to be legal, the authentication operated by the reader for the group is successful. Otherwise, the group authentication fails. At the same time, it can be determined which tag is a threat for the RFID system by the reader.
Additionally, the reader interacts with a tag for only three times. So the traffic has been decreased compared with the same agreement. When the reader receives the response from the tag, it will check the tag's group instead of checking each item in the database firstly, which can reduce the searching load efficiently.
On the other hand, during the total process, there are several kinds of computation. They are listed as follows: keys calculation (in initialization phase), computation by every tag for three times (the random number generation for once, the computation on exclusive or for once and the computation on hash for once), computation by the reader labels for four times (the random number generation for once, the computation on decimal addition for once, the computation on decimal subtraction for once, the computation on absolute value). Among these computations, the key calculation is performed by the trusted third party. The computation on the hash function is used only for once to encrypt data. There are only simple subtraction, addition and "absolute value calculation" performed by the reader. Thus overhead on authentication can be reduced.
Therefore, the performance of the protocol has been improved.
Analysis on Security
A successful attack for this protocol means that the adversary can achieve the corresponding straight line for the tag by calculating, then choose a point from the optional
Counterfeit tag attack
It can be seen that in the protocol, the message sent by the tags is the hash of the random number and the keys. In this way, the adversary cannot get the key i b . Therefore, during the authentication, the adversary cannot calculate a legitimate message. There are only some old legal messages can be utilized by the adversary. However these messages does not have freshness for the random number contained in which is not the newest. So the adversary cannot pretend to be a legal tag successfully. recorded during last round to the tags. Because there is a random number within the reader's response that generated by the tag, the adversary cannot be authenticated as a legal reader. So the adversary cannot pretend to be a legal reader successfully.
Method Ⅱ : The adversary recorded the messages transmitted during one round of authentication, including the messages , 
Anti-tracking Attack:
The purpose of tracking attack is to distinguish one tag from the others by some characteristic information. From the analysis above, the security information about the tags will not be achieved by the adversary. So the protocol can resist tracking attack.
Anti-desynchronization Attack:
Desynchronization attack is a threat for the RFID systems with update mechanism. The adversary attacks the system by prevent one entity of the system from updating the keys. But in this protocol, the new update mechanism can help avoid desynchronization. So the protocol can resist the desynchronization attack. 
R b e lie v e s T c o n tr o ls S h a r e d K e y (a , c ,T , R ) i i i T b e lie v e s R c o n tr o ls S h a r e d K e y (b ,T , R )
P3.
ii T b e lie v e s R c o n tr o ls (fr e s h (b )) i i i R b e lie v e s T c o n tr o ls (fr e s h (a , c ))
2.
The presumption of about the message received by the subject P4. It is available by (1) and necessity rule 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an RFID grouping proof protocol based on a novel key distribution method. It can be used in many practical applications where there are two or more entities should be together, such as the drugs and the pallet for a specific patient. Because the pallet represents the identity of the patient and the drugs are assigned to the patient. When there are some other drugs not for the patient in the pallet sent to the patient, it may cause some dangerous accident. With the RFID grouping proof protocol, the drugs and the pallet for the same patient can be guaranteed to appear simultaneously.
In this paper, some theoretical basis has been established. The analysis and logical proof of the protocol show that the protocol can resist replay attack and many other attacks with lower overhead and higher security. As our future work, we will introduce the RFID grouping proof protocol into as many as practical scenarios. In this way, the protocol will be verified by the experimental data and optimized for practical applications.
